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                                                                   Abstract 
This paper studies whether municipal expenditure in Italy is influenced by female representation 
in city councils. To correctly capture the causal relation we use the instrumental variable 
technique. Our instrument is based on a temporary change in the Italian normative occurred 
between 1993 and 1995 that reserved a gender quota in party lists for municipal elections, 
causing an exogenous change in the number of women elected in city councils. We take 
advantage of the fact that not all the municipalities have been treated by the law, due to its short 
period of enforcement. Despite the existence of gender specific preferences in the society, we 
find no evidence that the allocation of resources among different spending categories is affected 
by the gender of politicians. Our results are consistent with the Median voter theorem. 
Alternatively, they may suggest that the gender is not a determinant of politicians’ voting 
behaviour, implying that the preferences of the women involved in political activities are close to 
those of their male colleagues. 
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1. Introduction.   
Is public spending affected by “gender bias”? More explicitly, could different proportions of 
women and men in political institutions result in dissimilar expenditure allocation decisions? 
This question arises from observing that in several countries, both industrialized and less 
developed, women are underrepresented in political institutions. We wonder if this bias in 
political representation may have broader economic and social consequences, besides being a 
problem of equal opportunities in entering politics. In fact, women and men may have 
different priorities or preferences which could reflect the different roles played in the society 
and within the family (Svaleryd, 2009; Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Funk and Gathmann, 
2010).  For example, women could be more interested in childcare and educational activities, 
because the improvement of these services could allow them to better conciliate private and 
working life. In addition, women could pay more attention to the functioning of local 
transportation services, since they seem to be more dependent from public transports. These 
gender differences in preferences may also be brought into political institutions, influencing 
the voting behaviour of politicians and, consequently, the allocation of resources across 
spending categories.  
The empirical evidence provided so far on the existence of gender specific decisions on 
public spending is mixed. Also in the theoretical literature the importance of politicians’ 
characteristics, gender included, in shaping the implemented polices is disputed. More 
precisely, scholars wonder if all groups have to be represented in elected assemblies for their 
interest to be taken into account. A positive answer to the question is contained in the 
Citizen Candidate Model, that requires that elected representatives, at least to some degree, 
can pursue their own preferred policies and that candidate cannot credibly commit 
themselves to implement policies that do not fulfil their preferences (Besley and Coate, 1997; 
Osborne and Slivinski, 1996; Alesina, 1988). A different way to describe the relationship 
between voters’ and politicians’ preferences is provided by the Median Voter Theorem 
(Downs, 1957), according to which politicians’ identity and the preferences should not 
impact on policy outcomes, because candidates’ behaviors would converge to catch the 
preferences of the median voter. According to this interpretation, the gender should not be 
relevant in affecting politicians’ preferences.  
We indirectly test the validity of these two alternative hypotheses, empirically addressing the 
existence of the “gender bias” within Italian municipal councils. More precisely, we analyse 
the relationship between the allocation of public spending and the percentage of female 
politicians in city councils. In Italy municipalities are deputed to offer many services at local 
level, such as the management of public utilities (local roads, water, sewage, garbage, etc..) 
and the provision of transportation, nursery schools, and assistance to elderly people. In 
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their spending decisions they enjoy high autonomy, following that local politicians play a 
crucial role in choosing among a large variety of services to provide.  As far as we know, this 
is one of the first attempts to provide an empirical evidence on the causal effect of gender 
on policy outcomes in Italy, where women are deeply underrepresented, compared to the 
other industrialized countries, both in national and local governments. A previous work on 
Italy is Gagliarducci and Paserman (2009)1 that mainly focuses on the relation between the 
major’ gender and the stability of local governments, but that also includes an analysis on the 
effects on budget allocation. Differently from their work, which is centred on the major role, 
we choose to focus on city councils. These are municipal representative institutions, whose 
members are directly elected every 5 years2 by citizens. Since in Italy there exist the so called 
preference vote, voters can directly show their preference for a female or male politicians by 
voting for that candidate. The council approves by simple majority rule all the decisions, 
including the budgetary ones.  
When investigating the gender effects on spending decisions it is fundamental to correctly 
capture the causal relation, avoiding spurious correlations. Municipalities where a higher 
number of women is elected may be different for social, economic and cultural features from 
those where the female share is low. While some possible differences can be controlled for, 
there are some citizens’ preferences and values which are not observable. Such unobservable 
aspects may affect not only the composition of the city councils but also the allocation of 
public spending. For example, people may attribute great relevance to the value of equality: 
this can affect the preferred expenditure allocation in the sense that resources have to be 
used to reduce population disparities. Moreover, the value of equality can also affect the 
gender composition of the municipal institutions since citizens may prefer a more equal 
proportion of female and male representatives.  
To identify a truly “gender effect”, we exploit a change in the Italian normative which 
occurred between April 1993 and September 1995. This law reserved a gender quota in 
parties’ lists for municipal elections, which worked as a lower bound for the percentage of 
female candidates, due the traditionally low number of women in the electoral lists. 
However, not all the Italian municipalities voted under the gender quota regime because of 
the short period during which the law was in force and of the differences in elections 
calendars. As shown by De Paola et al. (2010), this law produced a permanent and 
exogenous increase of female politicians in those municipalities where an election took place 
in the years of enforcement of the law. Therefore, the ultimately effect of the quota regime 
was to split Italian municipalities between “treated” and “not treated” by the law. Our 
                                                                
1 We are aware that Casarico and Profeta (2010) are working on a project about the relation between the gender of 
the major and public expenditure allocation in Italian municipalities. However, the work is still not available. 
2 With the exception of the period 1993-1998, when the duration of the electoral mandate was of 4 years. 
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empirical strategy consists in instrumenting the percentage of women elected in the 
municipality with a dummy variable, which distinguishes between treated and not treated 
municipalities. The instrument is exogenous with respect to the municipal unobservable 
preferences, because the treatment was totally random since it depended only on the 
elections’ calendar. Moreover, as measured in De Paola et al. (2010), the instrument is 
relevant since the treatment had significant effects on the number of women elected even 
after the abolishment of the gender quota regime. This allow us to correctly estimate the 
causal relation between the gender composition of the council and the spending decisions, 
isolating the effects due to the gender of politicians from those related to unobservable 
preferences.  
Before implementing the instrumental variable technique, we run standard panel regressions 
covering the period 1998-2006. These show that higher women participation (measured as 
the share of women over total seats) positively affects only administration expenditure. 
However, the size of the estimated parameter is small. No effects are found for the other 
categories of spending (environment, education, social assistance and transports). Other 
variables seem to matter in explaining expenditure allocation, such as the age and the 
education of the politicians, the major’ political affiliation, the demographic structure of the 
population and the level of municipal wealth. In order to ensure robustness to our results, 
we tried different definitions of our dependent variable, aiming to capture the bargaining 
power of female politicians. In particular, in one specification we restrict out attention 
exclusively to the women belonging to the major coalition, while in another set of 
regressions we use the percentage of women in the executive committee. Results seem to be 
robust across different specifications. Moreover, we split the sample in two parts according 
to the female representation, finding that those with the highest percentages differently 
allocate public spending, in favour of transports and administration, while reducing 
environmental expenditure. So, gender plays a more significant role when the female 
representation reaches a given threshold. However, it worth noticing that the spending 
categories usually associated to women preferences, such as education or social assistance, 
are never influenced by the gender of the politicians. 
When we address the endogeneity issue using instrumental variables, the gender effect 
completely disappears, showing that the composition of city council does not shape at all the 
expenditure allocation of Italian municipalities. 
The remaining part of the paper is structured as follow. Section 2 briefly reviews the main 
results of the literature, while section 3 describes the data and provides some descriptive 
statistics. The basic econometric specification and first results are the contents of section 4. 
In section 5 we discuss different specifications of the estimated equation. Section 6 
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introduces our instrumental variable and it presents the results obtained when we control for 
possible endogeneity. Finally, section 7 concludes.   
 
2. Literature Review. 
In recent years several works have empirically addressed the relationship between the gender 
of the politicians and policy outcomes. So far, the evidence provided is mixed. These 
differences could be partially due to the fact that these analyses cover both developing and 
developed countries which differ for many economic, social and cultural aspects. Moreover, 
they focus on different levels of governments (municipal or regional) and on different 
institutions (the major or representative bodies). In this section we briefly summarize the 
main findings on this issue. 
Besley and Case (2003) show that female politicians in the United States legislative bodies 
apply pressure to increase spending on family assistance and to strengthen child support 
provision. Ferreira and Gyourko (2010), using data on female majors in the US, provide 
evidence that gender has no effect on the size and the composition of local public spending. 
To deal with the endogeneity of female partecipation to municipal preferences and 
characteristics, they use the regression discontinuity design (RDD) approach. Basically, they 
compare short and long run outcomes across elections in which a female candidate barely 
wins against a male candidate to those in which the woman barely loses to a male candidate.  
Rehavi (2007), using a RDD inspired instrumental variable approach, finds that the raise in 
the number of female legislators in the US modestly increases health expenditure. He uses 
the number of women in legislatures that result from the outcome of very close elections 
involving one male and one female candidate as an instrument for the overall number of 
women in legislatures in any particular year. 
Moving to Northern European countries, Svaleryd (2009) analyzes the allocation of 
spending in Swedish municipalities, showing that the shares of women in local councils 
increase education and childcare spending to the detriment of elderly care. Halse (2009), 
using Norwegian municipalities, find a relationship between the gender of the politicians and 
the budget share devoted to childcare, but the estimated effects are very small. To avoid 
spurious correlations the author instrument the share of women elected, using the fact that 
some of Norwegian parties have imposed, in different years, quota rules to achieve higher 
shares of women on election lists.  However, as the author claims, the instrument appeared 
weak to have reliable results to comment.  
As regard other European countries, Funk and Gathmann (2010), considering data on 
voting in federal ballots in Switzerland, show that women and men have different 
preferences on public goods. Moreover, they find that the gender greatly affects the 
composition of government expenditures. In particular, in the budget formation women are 
 6
more in favour of environment with respect to agricultural and military spending. Campa 
(2011) analyzes the effects of gender quotas on the election of female politicians in Spain, 
finding that the size and composition of local government expenditures are not influenced 
by the number of women elected.  
Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) study the causal effect of female policy-makers in India 
through a randomized policy experiment. The reservation of one-third of the seats for 
women imposed by the law affects policy decisions in ways that seem to better reflect 
women preferences in favour of the provision of better roads and of drinking water facilities. 
Also Clots-Figueras (2009), focusing on India, finds that a higher representation of female 
politicians increases the educational levels of individuals who live in the districts where these 
politicians are elected.  
Similar to Ferreira and Gyourko (2010), but looking at Italian municipalities, Gagliarducci 
and Paserman (2009) apply RDD analysis. They find that the gender of the major affects the 
duration of the governments in Italian municipalities, but not the levels of budget deficit, 
revenues and investments per capita. Moreover, they show that the shares of expenditures 
on education, welfare and security are not shaped by the gender of the major. Our paper 
contributes to this literature providing new and more detailed evidence on the gender effect 
in Italy. 
 
3. Data sets and descriptive statistics. 
To build our dataset we rely on two main sources of information: the first one reports data 
on politicians elected in municipal councils, while the second one assembles municipal 
balance sheets. 
Data on politicians who seat in city councils has been collected by the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs from 1985. In particular, it contains information on the gender, the age, the 
education level and the affiliation party of the politicians. The dataset reveals that women are 
strongly underrepresented. Although the female participation in Municipal Councils, 
measured as the number of women over the total seats3, has been increasing over time, it 
reaches only the 18 per cent in 2008 (graph 1). A strong raise (around 8 percentage points) 
has occurred between 1993 and 1995, when the gender quota law was implemented. Female 
underrepresentation concerns also the executive committee (from 13 per cent in 1998 to 16 
per cent in 2008) and majors (from 3 to 10 per cent in the same years).  
We observe also an increase over time in the variability across municipalities of the 
percentage of women in the councils. In fact, at the end of the ‘80s more than 75 per cent of 
municipalities had less than 10 per cent of women in their Councils, while only 2 per cent 
                                                                
3 The number of total seats vary from 12 to 60, according to the population size of the municipality. 
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reached the 20 per cent. In 2008 the concentration in the left part of the distribution is 
significantly lower (only 26 per cent has less than 10 per cent of female politicians), while the 
number of municipalities with more than 20 per cent has increased to 40 per cent (Graph 2).  
Our data also reveal large differences in female participation across municipalities: the share 
of women is higher in small cities (Graph 3) and in those located in the North and in the 
Centre of Italy (Graph 4). 
On average, female politicians who seat in the councils appear to be more educated and 
younger than their male colleagues. In fact, women in charge in 2008 had spent around 13 
years in education, one year more than men, and their average age was 43 years, 5 years less 
than men. These gaps have been kept almost constant over time (Graphs 5 and 6).  
Municipal balance sheets, collected by the Ministry of Internal Affairs from 1998 and 
published by the Italian Institute of Statistics (Istat), contain data on current and capital 
expenditures. In our work we consider both total expenditure (as a sum of capital and 
current expenditure) and each of these two categories separately. In fact, they are different in 
their scopes and consequently they can be differently affected by the politicians’ gender. 
Current spending are used to provide services and for redistributive purposes, and they 
ensure the regular functioning of the municipality. Instead, capital spending includes direct 
and indirect investments, capital contribution and granting of loans, and they usually concern 
the purchase of real property and durable goods. Between 1998 and 2007 the share of capital 
spending is about 10 per cent of total spending, while the remaining fraction is used for 
current expenditure. Around 40 per cent of the latter is devoted to personnel payment, and 
another 40 cent is used for the purchase of goods and services. The last 20 per cent includes 
transfers and financial operations.  
Considering spending categories, in the sample period almost 40 per cent of total resources 
covered administration costs. Environment, transports and education expenditure accounted 
for, respectively, the 19, 11 and 10 per cent. Furthermore, social assistance spending, that 
includes also child and elderly care, counted for the 8 per cent of the expenditure (graph 7). 
Finally, a variety of other functions (justice, police, culture, sports, tourism and economic 
activities) sums up to the remaining 12 per cent. Over the period, we identify a decreasing 
trend for the financial resources devoted to education and to environment, compensated by 
an increase for administration and social assistance costs. Moreover, there is a consistent 
variability across municipalities in terms of the shares of financial resources devoted to each 
category, as shown by the standard deviations reported in table 1.  
Our sample of analysis covers around 7500 Italian municipalities, out of around 8100. The 
72 per cent of the municipalities belongs to the smallest size class (less than 5000 
inhabitants), the 20 per cent of them has between 5000 and 15000 inhabitants and the 8 per 
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cent has more than 15000 inhabitants. As regard the location, 52 per cent are in the North of 
the country, 22 per cent in the Centre and 25 per cent in the South of Italy.  
 
4. Empirical strategy and first results. 
Before empirically address the role of gender in political decisions, we firstly look to the 
existence of differences in preferences between men and women. In fact, if there are no 
differences, there is no reason to assume that gender could be relevant in affecting the 
allocation of municipal spending. The existence of gender specific preferences is illustrated 
in several works, such as Svaleryd (2009), Croson & Gneezy (2009) and Funk & Gathmann 
(2010). To have a further evidence, focused on the Italian context, we perform an additional 
analysis considering the Italian Households Multiscope Survey, which refers to about 19.000 
people interviewed in 2010 and contains some questions useful for our purposes. In 
particular, people interviewed are asked to express their opinion on what they consider the 
main problems in Italy. Results show that women and men preferences differ in a systematic 
way. More precisely, as shown in table 2, the share of positive answer is statistically higher 
for women as concerns unemployment, crime, health services, education system, 
immigration and poverty. In contrast, it is higher the percentage of men that consider tax 
evasion, public debt and justice as critical issues that need a government action. These results 
seem to confirm the role of gender in identifying priorities on public issues. Transferring 
such differences in the municipal context, we may expect that female politicians could be 
more favourable to finance education and social assistance  spending.  
The next step is to find out if the gender of politicians drives municipal spending pattern, 
running municipal level regressions covering the period 1998-2006. The assumed 
specification is the following: 
 
Yit= β1 + β2 *  WRit +  β3 * COUNCit+  β4 * MUNIC it + λt +εit 
 
where the index i refers to municipality and index t to year. Our dependent variable is the 
share of expenditure allocated to each category (administration, education, transports, 
environment and social assistance) with respect to the total amount of spending. To capture 
the gender effect on public spending, we consider the ratio of women over the total number 
of members in the Municipal Council (WR), which is intended to proxy of the women 
bargaining power in influencing spending decisions, since decisions are taken by a simple 
majority rule.  
To ensure a correct identification of the relation, we control for politicians characteristics 
(COUNC) that can influence their preferences. The regressors includes the gender of the 
major (dummy variable equal to 1 if the major is female), the average age and education of 
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the politicians, and the incumbent party (dummy variables for left, right, centre and civic 
lists).  The other set of controls (MUNIC) is related to municipal characteristics, and it 
includes time-invariant variables, such as the location of the municipality (dummies equal to 
1 if the municipality is located next to mountains or next to the sea) and its size (km2), and 
time variant regressors, such as the population, the per capita number of crimes registered, 
the voter turnout in municipal elections, the GDP of the province where the municipality is 
located, the ratio of babies, scholars and old people over the total population. Most of these 
variables have a clear impact on spending needs. For example, the demographic structure 
can explain expenditure in childcare, education and elderly care. The location of the 
municipality can drive the choices of the Municipal Councils as regard infrastructures or 
tourism spending, while the per capita number of crimes influences police expenditures and 
security measures. With the voter turnout we aim to proxy the level of social capital and with 
GDP we control for municipal wealth, that can affect the spending structure. Controlling for 
municipal characteristics is fundamental in order to check if we can reduce the estimation 
bias due to the existence of citizens’ unobservable preferences, that can be correlated with 
observable characteristic at municipal level. Finally, we insert provincial dummies that should 
take into account fixed characteristics at provincial level and year dummies (λt) Standard 
errors are made robust to heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the municipality level. 
We estimate the model with the random effect. In fact, the standard test which discriminates 
between the random and the fixed effect does not show significant differences between the 
two estimators. However, we remind that we have introduced time invariant covariates at 
municipal level and provincial dummies that are already taking into account for fixed effects. 
Since the test reveals that there is no significant municipal fixed effect that can bias the 
estimated coefficients, the choice of the random effect is preferable since it is more efficient 
than the fixed effect estimator.  
In the first set of regressions (table 3, 4 and 5) we only include the controls for politicians’ 
characteristics, while in the second step we add all the municipal controls. Results of the first 
step specification show that the higher the fraction of female counsellors, the higher is the 
share of total expenditure for administration and transports, and the lower for environment 
(table 3). Same results when we consider the current expenditure (table 5). However, the 
sizes of the significant parameters are very small, implying an almost negligible effect of the 
gender variable. For example, an increase in the women ratio of one percentage point 
changes the ratio of expenditure devoted to a certain category of around 0,01 per cent. It 
worth noticing that the spending categories usually associated to women preferences, such as 
education or social assistance, are never influenced by the gender of the politicians. When we 
focus on capital expenditure (table 4), it seems that a different composition of the council in 
terms of the gender of politicians do not affect spending allocation.  
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When we include all municipal level controls (table 6 for the total spending), the estimated 
parameters related to the percentage of female policy-makers are never statistically different 
form zero, except for the administration expenditure. When we focus on current 
expenditures, also environment spending is influenced by the ratio of women in the councils 
(table 8). So, in the more complete specification, the gender effect is smaller, both in terms 
of the category of spending affected and in terms of the magnitude of the estimation 
parameters.   
As concerns other regressors, we note that the gender of the major is not significant (or 
weakly significant for some categories of current expenditure). This result enforces our 
finding that gender seems to be scarcely relevant for the policymaker decisions. Moreover, it 
moves out the hypothesis that public spending allocation could be driven by the gender of 
major, whose role is considered crucial in shaping voting behaviour in city councils. In 
contrast, the demographic structure of the population show a greater explanatory power. In 
fact, higher percentages of children and scholars increase, as expected, the relative spending 
in education. Also some councillors’ characteristics matter for public spending, although the 
estimated coefficients are smaller: increasing the average education and their age favours 
spending in education, social assistance and environment, while it reduces administration 
and transports’ expenditure. Finally, many time invariant characteristics at municipal level 
seem to be significant in explaining different spending allocations (dummies for the location 
and provincial fixed effect).   
 
5. Alternative specifications in the estimated equation.  
So far we have considered the total number of female politicians as a proxy of their 
bargaining power in the council, taking the assumption that there could exist a bias driven 
exclusively by the sex of the politicians, independently from being affiliated to the winning 
coalition. However, it is also possible that only those women that belong to the major 
political coalition play an effective role when voting in spending decisions. To test this 
hypothesis, we run similar regressions using the fraction of women belonging to the major 
coalition. These regressions confirm previous results, showing a small gender bias in favour 
of administration total expenditure (table 9). In addition, there appears a low significant but 
positive coefficient as regard the effect of women on transports spending. In another 
regression (not shown) we interact the fraction of women belonging to the winning coalition 
with the major’ political orientation, in order to capture if the gender bias depends on the 
political orientation. However, the coefficients of the interaction terms are not statistically 
different from zero. 
As a further robustness check, we run similar regressions using the percentage of women in 
the executive committee. In this way we check if our results are driven by the political 
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institution chosen. In these estimates there is a complete absence of a gender bias on total 
spending allocation (table 10).   
In another set of regressions we investigate if the relationship between women 
representation and political choices is not linear. In fact, it possible that the role of women 
start to be relevant in term of bargaining power only when the female shares reach a given 
threshold. In order to take this into account, we identify three different thresholds that 
coincide with the first quartile, the median and the third quartile of the women participation 
distribution (respectively equal to 8, 15 and 23 per cent of women over total seats). For each 
of these thresholds, one by one, we introduce in the regression a dummy variable, which 
takes value equal to 1 when the share of women exceeds the threshold itself. These dummies 
are used in place of the percentage of women in the council. Our findings show that the 
gender effect exists only when the highest threshold is passed. In other words, moving from 
below to above the 3rd quartile in term of female participation increases administration and 
transportation total expenditure, while it decreases environment spending (table 13). On the 
contrary, we do not find significant effect for the other dummy variables associated to the 
lower thresholds (tables 11 and 12). This means that higher percentages of women in 
political institutions are required in order to affect financial choices. Although the 
introduction of gender quotas rules contributed positively to increase the number of female 
politicians, only a small fraction of municipalities show sufficiently high shares of women. 
Small raises in the number of elected women could not be enough to observe policy 
changes, which probably require stronger changes in female participation. 
Finally, the amount and the allocation of public expenditure, and in particular capital 
expenditure, may vary significantly over time, depending, for instance, whether the financial 
decisions are taken at the beginning or at the end of the electoral mandate. So, we consider 
as unit of the analysis not the single year, but the entire mandate, focusing on the average 
values of expenditure allocated in the period. Furthermore, to avoid distortions related to the 
timing of electoral cycles we consider only those mandates that are complete (5 years). Since 
our sample spans between 1998 and 2006, we have only one observation for each 
municipality. However, in some cases we have premature ends of the mandate due to 
political crises. This, along with some missing observations, reduces the size of our sample 
to around 5.500 units. Cross municipalities regressions support the positive relation found in 
the panel regressions between total administrative spending and the percentage of female 
politicians (table 14). Surprisingly, we find that a higher representation of women lowers 
social assistance expenditure. 
The last check we performed is related the fact that part of the municipal expenditure can be 
pre-committed, meaning that the members of the council does not effectively take decisions 
on some type of expenditure. For example, spending for personnel payment can not be 
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substantially modified, being almost fixed over time. Therefore, we removed this category 
from the current expenditure, but results (not displayed) in term of gender effect did not 
change from those of our baseline specification.  
Table 15 summarizes all the results obtained so far. We display the signs and the degrees of 
significance of the estimated coefficients for the women ratio regressor. Most results are 
similar among different specifications. Female politicians’ play a role in increasing 
administration and transports expenditure, and in decreasing environment and social 
assistance spending.  However, the sizes of coefficients are small, implying there the gender 
effect plays a minority role.  Education spending is never affected by the gender of the 
politicians. 
 
6. Instrumental variable estimates.  
Although in the panel regressions we introduce several control variables related to social, 
cultural, geographic and economic characteristics, there are still some unobservable 
differences among municipalities in term of citizens’ preferences and values which can affect 
the expenditure choices. These preferences can also influence the voting behaviour of 
citizens when choosing among candidates of different sex in elections. This constitutes a 
clear problem of omitted variables: the unobserved preferences influence both the 
dependent variable and the independent variable, preventing the correct identification of the 
causal relation we are interested in. We don’t have a clear prior of the direction of the bias 
generated by these omitted controls for citizens’ preferences. This is due to the complexity 
of the set of preferences we are not able to observe, which can influence different categories 
of spending in opposite ways.  As mentioned, the endogeneity problem has been recently 
addressed with the RDD approach. Since this estimation technique is not applicable in our 
setting4, we solve the problem of endogeneity using a different estimation strategy which 
exploits a change in the Italian normative which occurred between April 1993 and 
September 1995.  
The Law no. 81 of March 25, 1993 introduced some important changes in the Italian local 
electoral system, such as the direct election of the major and of the president of the 
province. More importantly for our purpose, it established that neither sex could represent 
more than two thirds of a party list of candidates for municipal elections. In municipalities 
with up to 15.000 inhabitants, the maximum quota was set at three quarters. However, on 
September 1995 the Sentence no.422 of the Constitutional Court repealed the section of the 
                                                                
4The regression-discontinuity design uses a cut-off selection method. The sample is cut in two, with one group as control and 
the rest as the treatment group. In the gender literature, municipalities are split into two groups according to the sex of the 
major elected. Considering only those municipalities in which one candidate barely wins against another of a different sex, it 
is reasonable to assume that the gender of the major elected is random, not driven by specific unobservable peculiarities of the 
municipality.  
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law containing the gender quotas, because of the right of equal access to elective offices 
protected in the Italian Constitution. 
This law worked as a lower bound for the percentage of female candidates, due the 
traditionally low number of women in the lists. As shown in De Paola et all.(2010) with a 
difference-in-differences estimation strategy, the reservation of candidacies for women 
translated in a higher number of elected women5. Moreover, they find the effects of the law 
lasted for some years after its abolishment. However, because of short period during which 
the law was in force and of the differences in the election calendars, not all municipalities 
voted under this regime and experienced such an increase in the share of female politicians. 
Therefore, the normative change split municipalities into two groups: treated and not treated 
by the law6. The treated municipalities experienced a change in the female participation 
referable not to endogenous citizens’ preference but to the exogenous change imposed by 
the law. This allows us to use the split produced by the law to instrument the percentage of 
women elected in the municipality. More precisely, our instrument is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 if the municipality voted during the period of validity of the gender quota, and 0 
otherwise. We limit our instrumental variable regressions to the period 1998-2003. In fact, 
computing the standard test on the relevance of the instrument for a more extended period, 
the instrument becomes weak. The effects of the law on the number of elected women 
progressively decrease after its abolishment and seem to end in 2004, when the majority of 
the municipalities had a new election. This instrument satisfies the two conditions for the 
choice of the instrument: the exogeneity and the relevance. First of all, having voted or not 
during the gender quotas is completely random, since it depends only on the election 
calendar, which ensure that the instrument is exogenous. Second, the relevance of the 
instrument has been empirically tested in De Paola et all.(2010). In table 16 we show the first 
stage of the IV estimation. 
In this new set of regressions, that control for the possible endogenity, the effect of different 
gender composition in municipal councils completely disappears. The estimated coefficients 
of the share of women are never statistically different from zero, both considering total 
spending and splitting between capital and current one (tables 17, 18, 19). Our finding is in 
line with the most recent papers. The demographic structure and municipal characteristics 
seem to be the real drivers of the expenditure decisions. The politicians’ characteristics 
become less relevant with respect to the standard panel regression results, excepted for the 
average level of education. 
                                                                
5A theoretical explanation of this effect  is also presented  in Bonomi, Brosio, Di Tommaso (2009).   
6The treated and the not treated groups represent respectively the 95 and the 5 per cent of the sample.  
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Finally, we also tried to extend the instrumental variable approach to the regressions where 
the thresholds dummies were used as a proxy of gender bargaining power. In fact, such 
regressions showed a more relevant gender effect. Unfortunately, in this case we cannot 
solve the endogenity problem since our instrument reveals to be weak.  
 
7. Conclusions.  
In this work we study the existence of a gender effect in municipal spending decisions. We 
run both panel regressions at municipal level and instrumental variable estimations to correct 
for possible problems of endogeneity. The instrument is based on a normative change, that 
sets a lower bound for the number of female politicians in parties lists. Results show that the 
gender of the politicians does not matter when looking at local expenditure allocation in 
Italian municipalities. In particular, spending categories typically associated to women 
preferences, such as childcare and education, do not benefit from a greater representation of 
women in municipal councils.   
Possibly, results can be driven by the fact that shares of women in municipal councils are 
usually small and it is possible that the gender effect we are looking for requires a higher 
female representation. In other terms, women's representation needs to reach a certain 
critical level to matter for the decision process. In fact, the group of municipalities whose 
shares of female politicians is above this threshold shows a significantly different allocation 
of public spending. However, in this setting we are not able to control for spurious 
correlations, in order to get reliable results. Non linearities in the gender effect suggest that 
the introduction of gender quotas in Italy has been useful to increase female participation, 
but not enough to impact financial resources allocation. 
Taking the above consideration into account, the absence of the gender bias seems to 
support the Median voter theorem, stating that only citizens’ preferences matter for policy 
making, and not those of politicians. However, an alternative explanation could be that 
politicians still vote according to their own preferences, but that the gender is not a 
determinant of their voting behaviour. A possible interpretation of such behaviour can be 
that women involved in political activities could spontaneously move their preferences closer 
to the males’ ones, comparing to the not involved ones. 
In any case, our results should not be interpreted in the sense that the problem of women 
underrepresentation in political institutions is irrelevant. In fact, it remains the problem of 
equal opportunities in entering politics and of adequate representativeness of institutions, 
mainly because Italy is one of the developed countries with the lowest rate of female 
participation in politics. Moreover, female politicians could impact on political choices in a 
number of ways not considered in this analysis, for example in improving the political 
decisional process or promoting the adoption of best practices.   
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Graph 1 
Percentages of women in Municipal councils and of females majors. 
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Graph 2 
Distribution, by year, of the percentages of women in the council. 
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Graph 3 
Average ratios of women in the councils, by municipality size.  
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Graph 4  
Average ratios of women in the councils, by location. 
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Graph 5 
Average years of education of local politicians, by gender. 
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Graph 6 
Average age of local politicians, by gender. 
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Graph 7 
Composition of public expenditure. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of the variables included in the dataset in the period 1998-2006.  
 Obs. Mean SD 
Municipal Councils 
Proportion of seats by women over total seats in the Council 62936 0,169 0,104 
Proportion of female major over total 62936 0,079 0,269 
Proportion of seats by women affiliated to the major political 
orientation 
62936 0,136 0,106 
Age of the politicians  62936 44,350 3,978 
Education of the politicians in terms of years 62875 12,032 1,541 
Municipalities 
Size of the municipality in km2 62957 37,035 49,829 
Population in  the municipality 62936 7141, 2    41248,2      
Ratio of people under 6 years old 62936 0,052 0,013 
Ratio of people under 15 years old 62936 0,082 0,020 
Ratio of people over 65 years old 62936 0,212 0,064 
Number of crimes per capita 62306 0,041 0,016 
Voter turnout in municipal elections 59787 0,794 0,089 
GDP per capita at provincial level 62674 19628,4     5151,6      
                 Allocation of resources 
Ratio of expenditure spent for administration  62936 0,396 0,17  
Ratio of expenditure spent for environment 62936 0,193 0,091 
Ratio of expenditure spent for transports  62936 0,107 0,006 
Ratio of expenditure spent for education 62936 0,103 0,057 
Ratio of expenditure spent for social services 62936 0,068 0,069 
 
 
 
Table 2  
Italian Hoseholds Multiscope Survey 2010.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The P-values refer to the Adjusted Wald test of the null hypothesis that the two means are statistically equal. 
 
 
Percentages of positive 
answers Which is the main problem in Italy? Values 
Men Women 
P-value 
Unemployment 1=yes; 0=no 62,6 65,9 0,0000 
Crime 1=yes; 0=no 46,3 49,6 0,0000 
Tax evasion 1=yes; 0=no 19,8 14,9 0,0000 
Environment 1=yes; 0=no 10,9 11,3 0,2019 
Public debt 1=yes; 0=no 12,0 8,5 0,0000 
Health system 1=yes; 0=no 13,2 17,7 0,0000 
Education system 1=yes; 0=no 5,0 5,7 0,0047 
Justice 1=yes; 0=no 17,1 13,7 0,0000 
Immigration 1=yes; 0=no 24,8 26,3 0,0010 
Poverty 1=yes ; 0=no 23,1 26,2 0,0000 
Others 1=yes ; 0=no 2,2 1,6 0,0000 
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Table 3  
Panel regressions, total expenditure as dependent variable, short specification 
  Administration Education Transport Environment Social assistance 
      
women ratio 0,016*** 0,00174 0,006** -0,009* -0,00302 
 (-0,006) (-0,003) (-0,003) (-0,005) (-0,003) 
sex of the major 0,001 0,002 -0,001 -0,001 -0,001 
 (-0,002) (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,002) (-0,001) 
council average edu -0,006*** 0,001*** -0,002*** 0,002*** 0,001*** 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
council average age -0,001*** 0,000 -0,001*** 0,0005*** 0,0003*** 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
civic party -0,0003 0,002** -0,001 0,002 -0,002*** 
 (-0,002) (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,002) (-0,001) 
right party -0,00413* -0,00093 -0,00294** 0,002 0,000 
 (-0,002) (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,002) (-0,001) 
left party -0,00351* 0,001 -0,001 -0,001 -0,001 
 (-0,002) (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,002) (-0,001) 
Constant 0,485*** 0,134*** 0,130*** 0,159*** 0,0339*** 
 (-0,011) (-0,006) (-0,006) (-0,009) (-0,005) 
Observations 62813 62813 62813 62813 62813 
N. of municipalities 8011 8011 8011 8011 8011 
Standard errors clustered at municipality level, year and provincial dummies included. The dependent variable 
is the share of expenditure devoted to a certain category over the total. 
*** p<0,01, ** p<0,05, * p<0,1     
 
Table 4 
Panel regressions, capital expenditure as dependent variable, short specification 
  Administration Education Transport Environment Social assistance 
      
women ratio -0,027 0,002 -0,006 0,021 -0,008* 
 (-0,017) (-0,009) (-0,014) (-0,016) (-0,005) 
sex of the major 0,002 0,005 -0,004 0,006 0,001 
 (-0,006) (-0,003) (-0,005) (-0,005) (-0,002) 
council average edu 0,004*** 0,003*** -0,006*** -0,003** 0,001** 
 (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,001) (0,000) 
council average age 0,001 0,000 -0,00141*** 0,000 0,000 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
civic party 0,004 -0,00670** 0,000 0,005 -0,001 
 (-0,006) (-0,003) (-0,005) (-0,006) (-0,002) 
right party 0,021*** -0,013*** -0,004 -0,010 -0,001 
 (-0,007) (-0,004) (-0,006) (-0,007) (-0,002) 
left party 0,009 -0,00622* -0,009* 0,006 -0,002 
 (-0,006) (-0,004) (-0,006) (-0,006) (-0,002) 
Constant 0,198*** 0,077*** 0,322*** 0,260*** 0,013 
 (-0,030) (-0,015) (-0,024) (-0,028) (-0,008) 
Observations 62813 62813 62813 62813 62813 
N. of municipalities 8011 8011 8011 8011 8011 
Standard errors clustered at municipality level, year and provincial dummies included. The dependent variable 
is the share of expenditure devoted to a certain category over the total. 
*** p<0,01, ** p<0,05, * p<0,1     
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Table 5 
Panel regressions, current expenditure as dependent variable, small specification 
  Administration Education Transport Environment Social assistance 
      
women ratio 0,01*** 0,003 0,005** -0,01*** -0,002 
 (-0,005) (-0,002) (-0,002) (-0,004) (-0,003) 
sex of the major 0,002 0,00214*** -0,001 -0,003 -0,001 
 (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,001) 
council average edu -0,005*** 0,001*** -0,001*** 0,002*** 0,001*** 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
council average age -0,001*** 0,000 0,000 0,0003*** 0,000*** 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
civic party -0,001 0,002** -0,001 0,002 -0,003*** 
 (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,001) 
right party -0,004** 0,000 -0,001 0,003* -0,001 
 (-0,002) (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,002) (-0,001) 
left party -0,001 0,00174** 0,000 -0,002 -0,00164* 
 (-0,002) (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,001) 
Constant 0,455*** 0,141*** 0,101*** 0,166*** 0,039*** 
 (-0,010) (-0,005) (-0,005) (-0,008) (-0,005) 
Observations 62813 62813 62813 62813 62813 
N. of municipalities 8011 8011 8011 8011 8011 
Standard errors clustered at municipality level, year and provincial dummies included. The dependent variable 
is the share of expenditure devoted to a certain category over the total. 
*** p<0,01, ** p<0,05, * p<0,1     
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Table 6 
Panel regressions, total expenditure as dependent variable. 
 
            
 Administration Education Transport Environment Social assistance 
      
Ratio of women in the council 0,013** 0,001 0,004 -0,007 -0,003 
 (-0,006) (-0,003) (-0,003) (-0,005) (-0,003) 
Gender of the major 0,000 0,001 -0,001 0,000 -0,001 
 (-0,002) (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,002) (-0,001) 
Council average education -0,005*** 0,001*** -0,002*** 0,001*** 0,001*** 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Council average age -0,001*** 0,000* -0,000*** 0,000** 0,000*** 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Civic party dummy 0,000 0,002** -0,001 0,001 -0,002** 
 (-0,002) (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,002) (-0,001) 
Right party dummy -0,002 0,000 -0,003** 0,000 0,000 
 (-0,002) (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,002) (-0,001) 
Left party dummy -0,002 0,001 -0,001 -0,001 -0,001 
 (-0,002) (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,002) (-0,001) 
Ratio of children 0,083 0,410*** 0,105** -0,451*** 0,052* 
 (-0,074) (-0,036) (-0,045) (-0,061) (-0,032) 
Ratio of scholars -0,122** 0,419*** 0,033 -0,271*** 0,054* 
 (-0,060) (-0,027) (-0,037) (-0,053) (-0,028) 
Ratio of people over 65  0,209*** -0,106*** 0,157*** -0,176*** -0,001 
 (-0,027) (-0,013) (-0,016) (-0,021) (-0,013) 
GDP of the province 0,000*** 0,000*** 0,000*** 0,000*** 0,000*** 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Population size 0,000 0,000 0,000 -0,000*** 0,000 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Voter turnout  0,016 -0,009** -0,005 0,006 -0,013*** 
 (-0,010) (-0,004) (-0,006) (-0,009) (-0,005) 
Number of per capita crimes -0,006 0,019 0,045** 0,001 0,000 
 (-0,033) (-0,016) (-0,018) (-0,030) -0,015) 
Mountains dummy 0,005 -0,004** 0,015*** 0,010*** (-0,012*** 
 (-0,005) (-0,002) (-0,002) (-0,004) (-0,002) 
Seaside dummy -0,025*** -0,021*** 0,000 0,038*** -0,001 
 (-0,004) (-0,002) (-0,002) (-0,003) (-0,002) 
Area 0,000*** 0,000*** 0,000 0,000** 0,000*** 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Constant 0,371*** 0,064*** 0,065*** 0,365*** 0,023** 
 (-0,020) (-0,009) (-0,011) (-0,018) (-0,009) 
      
Observations 59111 59111 59111 59111 59111 
N. of municipalities 7500 7500 7500 7500 7500 
Standard errors clustered at municipality level, year and provincial dummies included. The dependent variable is the share 
of expenditure devoted to a certain category over the total. 
*** p<0,01, ** p<0,05, * p<0,1 
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Table 7 
Panel regressions, capital expenditure as dependent variable.  
 
            
 Administration Education Transport Environment Social assistance 
      
Ratio of women in the council -0,024 0,004 -0,008 0,020 -0,009* 
 (-0,018) (-0,009) (-0,015) (-0,017) (-0,005) 
Gender of the major 0,002 0,005 -0,004 0,005 0,002 
 (-0,006) (-0,003) (-0,005) (-0,006) (-0,002) 
Council average education 0,002 0,003*** -0,005*** -0,003** 0,001*** 
 (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,001) (0,000) 
Council average age 0,000 0,001*** -0,001*** 0,000 0,000* 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Civic party dummy 0,006 -0,006* 0,000 0,004 -0,001 
 (-0,006) (-0,003) (-0,005) (-0,006) (-0,002) 
Right party dummy 0,02** -0,012*** -0,003 -0,008 -0,001 
 (-0,008) (-0,004) (-0,006) (-0,008) (-0,002) 
Left party dummy 0,010 -0,007* -0,009* 0,008 -0,002 
 (-0,006) (-0,004) (-0,006) (-0,007) (-0,002) 
Ratio of children 0,089 0,502*** 0,178 -0,233 -0,091 
 (-0,214) (-0,100) (-0,190) (-0,213) (-0,068) 
Ratio of scholars -0,285* 0,387*** 0,034 -0,078 0,019 
 (-0,168) (-0,080) (-0,146) (-0,175) (-0,048) 
Ratio of people over 65  -0,081 -0,151*** 0,199*** -0,047 -0,007 
 (-0,064) (-0,027) (-0,055) (-0,064) (-0,016) 
GDP of the province 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000*** 0,000 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Population size 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000** 0,000 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Voter turnout  -0,003 -0,015 -0,008 -0,017 -0,009 
 (-0,027) (-0,012) (-0,023) (-0,027) (-0,008) 
Number of per capita crimes -0,111 0,068 0,146 0,057 -0,065 
 (-0,130) (-0,088) (-0,115) (-0,126) (-0,046) 
Mountains dummy -0,043*** -0,007 0,012 0,040*** 0,000 
 (-0,010) (-0,005) (-0,008) (-0,011) (-0,002) 
Seaside dummy 0,021** -0,024*** 0,001 0,012 -0,006*** 
 (-0,010) (-0,003) (-0,007) (-0,010) (-0,002) 
Area 0,000 0,000*** 0,000 0,000 0,000 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Constant 0,232*** 0,013 0,217*** 0,388*** 0,024 
 (-0,059) (-0,031) (-0,050) (-0,059) (-0,017) 
      
Observations 59111 59111 59111 59111 59111 
N. of municipalities 7500 7500 7500 7500 7500 
Standard errors clustered at municipality level, year and provincial dummies included. The dependent variable is the share of 
expenditure devoted to a certain category over the total. 
*** p<0,01, ** p<0,05, * p<0,1 
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 Table 8 
  Panel regressions, current expenditure as dependent variable. 
 
            
 Administration Education Transport Environment Social assistance 
      
Ratio of women in the council 0,011** 0,002 0,004 -0,009** -0,002 
 (-0,005) (-0,002) (-0,002) (-0,004) (-0,003) 
Gender of the major 0,001 0,001* -0,001 -0,002* -0,001 
 (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,001) 
Council average education -0,004*** 0,001*** -0,001*** 0,001*** 0,001*** 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Council average age -0,000*** 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000*** 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Civic party dummy 0,000 0,002** 0,000 0,001 -0,002*** 
 (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,001) 
Right party dummy -0,003 0,000 0,000 0,001 -0,001 
 (-0,002) (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,002) (-0,001) 
Left party dummy 0,000 0,002* 0,000 -0,002 -0,002* 
 (-0,002) (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,001) 
Ratio of children 0,022 0,402*** 0,096*** -0,483*** 0,110*** 
 (-0,062) (-0,033) (-0,032) (-0,049) (-0,030) 
Ratio of scholars -0,117** 0,441*** 0,039 -0,321*** 0,058** 
 (-0,052) (-0,026) (-0,027) (-0,042) (-0,027) 
Ratio of people over 65  0,226*** -0,098*** 0,106*** -0,204*** 0,028** 
 (-0,026) (-0,013) (-0,014) (-0,018) (-0,014) 
GDP of the province 0,000*** 0,000*** 0,000*** 0,000*** 0,000*** 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Population size 0,000 0,000 0,000*** 0,000*** 0,000 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Voter turnout  0,005 -0,009** -0,007 0,022*** -0,013** 
 (-0,009) (-0,004) (-0,005) (-0,007) (-0,005) 
Number of per capita crimes 0,059** 0,002 0,0221* -0,036 -0,012 
 (-0,024) (-0,014) (-0,012) (-0,024) (-0,013) 
Mountains dummy 0,015*** -0,004** 0,015*** 0,006** -0,014*** 
 (-0,005) (-0,002) (-0,002) (-0,003) (-0,003) 
Seaside dummy -0,038*** -0,021*** -0,001 0,045*** -0,001 
 (-0,004) (-0,002) (-0,002) (-0,003) (-0,002) 
Area 0,000*** 0,000*** 0,000 0,000*** 0,000*** 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Constant 0,371*** 0,065*** 0,061*** 0,363*** 0,010 
 (-0,016) (-0,009) (-0,008) (-0,015) (-0,009) 
      
Observations 59111 59111 59111 59111 59111 
N. of municipalities 7500 7500 7500 7500 7500 
Standard errors clustered at municipality level, year and provincial dummies included. The dependent variable is the share of 
expenditure devoted to a certain category over the total. 
*** p<0,01, ** p<0,05, * p<0,1 
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Table 9 
Panel regressions, considering the percentage of women affiliated to the major’ party, total 
expenditure as dependent variable.  
 
            
 Administration Education Transport Environment Social assistance 
Ratio of women affiliated to 
the major party 0,011** 0,00 0,005* 0,00 0,00 
 (-0,01) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Gender of the major 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Council average education -0,005*** 0,001*** -0,002*** 0,001*** 0,001*** 
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Council average age -0,001*** 0,0001* -0,0002*** 0,0003** 0,0003*** 
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Civic party dummy 0,00 0,002** 0,00 0,00 -0,002** 
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Right party dummy 0,00 0,00 -0,003** 0,00 0,00 
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Left party dummy 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Ratio of children 0,08 0,410*** 0,105** -0,451*** 0,05 
 (-0,07) (-0,04) (-0,04) (-0,06) (-0,03) 
Ratio of scholars -0,121** 0,419*** 0,03 -0,271*** 0,054* 
 (-0,06) (-0,03) (-0,04) (-0,05) (-0,03) 
Ratio of people over 65  0,210*** -0,106*** 0,157*** -0,177*** 0,00 
 (-0,03) (-0,01) (-0,02) (-0,02) (-0,01) 
GDP of the province 0,000*** 0,000*** 0,000*** 0,000*** 0,000*** 
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Population size 0,00 0,00 0,00 -0,000*** 0,00 
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Voter turnout  0,02 -0,009** -0,01 0,01 -0,013*** 
 (-0,01) (0,00) (-0,01) (-0,01) (-0,01) 
Number of per capita crimes 0,00 0,02 0,0459** 0,00 0,00 
 (-0,03) (-0,02) (-0,02) (-0,03) (-0,01) 
Mountains dummy 0,01 -0,004** 0,015*** 0,009*** -0,012*** 
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Seaside dummy -0,026*** -0,021*** 0,00 0,038*** 0,00 
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Area -0,0003*** 0,000** 0,00 0,000** 0,0001*** 
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Constant 0,373*** 0,064*** 0,065*** 0,36*** 0,023** 
 (-0,02) (-0,01) (-0,01) (-0,02) (-0,01) 
      
Observations 59111 59111 59111 59111 59111 
N. of municipalities 7500 7500 7500 7500 7500 
Standard errors clustered at municipality level, year and provincial dummies included. The dependent variable is the share of 
expenditure devoted to a certain category over the total. 
*** p<0,01, ** p<0,05, * p<0,1 
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Table 10 
Panel regressions, considering the female ratio in the executive committee, total expenditure as 
dependent variable.  
 
            
 Administration Education Transport Environment Social assistance 
      
Ratio of women in the 
executive committee -0,002 0,002 -0,001 0,002 -0,003* 
 (-0,003) (-0,002) (-0,002) (-0,003) (-0,002) 
Gender of the major 0,001 0,000 -0,001 -0,001 -0,001 
 (-0,002) (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,002) (-0,001) 
Council average education -0,005*** 0,001*** -0,002*** 0,001*** 0,001*** 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Council average age -0,001*** 0,000* -0,000*** 0,000*** 0,000*** 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Civic party dummy 0,000 0,002** -0,001 0,001 -0,002** 
 (-0,002) (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,002) (-0,001) 
Right party dummy -0,002 0,000 -0,003** 0,000 0,000 
 (-0,002) (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,002) (-0,001) 
Left party dummy -0,002 0,001 -0,001 -0,001 -0,001 
 (-0,002) (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,002) (-0,001) 
Ratio of children 0,083 0,411*** 0,105** -0,451*** 0,052 
 (-0,074) (-0,036) (-0,045) (-0,061) (-0,032) 
Ratio of scholars -0,120** 0,418*** 0,033 -0,272*** 0,054** 
 (-0,060) (-0,027) (-0,037) (-0,053) (-0,028) 
Ratio of people over 65  0,211*** -0,106*** 0,157*** -0,178*** -0,001 
 (-0,027) (-0,013) (-0,016) (-0,021) (-0,013) 
GDP of the province 0,000*** 0,000*** 0,000*** -0,000*** 0,000*** 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Population size 0,000 0,000 0,000 -0,000*** 0,000 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Voter turnout  0,016 -0,009** -0,005 0,006 -0,013*** 
 (-0,010) (-0,004) (-0,006) (-0,009) (-0,005) 
Number of per capita crimes -0,006 0,019 0,0450** 0,001 0,000 
 (-0,033) (-0,016) (-0,018) (-0,030) (-0,015) 
Mountains dummy 0,005 -0,004** 0,015*** 0,010*** -0,012*** 
 (-0,005) (-0,002) (-0,002) (-0,004) (-0,002) 
Seaside dummy -0,026*** -0,021*** 0,000 0,038*** -0,001 
 (-0,004) (-0,002) (-0,002) (-0,003) (-0,002) 
Area -0,000*** 0,000*** 0,000 0,000*** 0,000*** 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Constant 0,375*** 0,064*** 0,066*** 0,363*** 0,023** 
 (-0,020) (-0,009) (-0,011) (-0,018) (-0,009) 
      
Observations 59111 59111 59111 59111 59111 
N. of municipalities 7500 7500 7500 7500 7500 
Standard errors clustered at municipality level, year and provincial dummies included. The dependent variable is the share of 
expenditure devoted to a certain category over the total. 
*** p<0,01, ** p<0,05, * p<0,1 
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Table 11 
Threshold regression, including a dummy=1 if the share of woman exceeds the first quartile of the 
distribution, 0 otherwise; total expenditure as dependent variable. 
 
            
 Administration Education Transport Environment Social assistance 
Threshold 1 (8% of women) 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Gender of the major 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Council average education -0,005*** 0,001*** -0,002*** 0,001*** 0,001*** 
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Council average age -0,001*** 0,0001* -0,0003*** 0,0004*** 0,0003*** 
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Civic party dummy 0,000 0,002** 0,000 0,000 -0,002** 
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Right party dummy 0,000 0,000 -0,003** 0,000 0,000 
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Left party dummy 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Ratio of children 0,08 0,411*** 0,106** -0,451*** 0,052* 
 (-0,07) (-0,04) (-0,04) (-0,06) (-0,03) 
Ratio of scholars -0,119** 0,419*** 0,03 -0,272*** 0,0533* 
 (-0,06) (-0,03) (-0,04) (-0,05) (-0,03) 
Ratio of people over 65  0,211*** -0,106*** 0,157*** -0,177*** 0,000 
 (-0,03) (-0,01) (-0,02) (-0,02) (-0,01) 
GDP of the province 0,000*** 0,000*** 0,000*** -0,000*** 0,000*** 
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Population size 0,000 0,000 0,000 -0,000*** 0,000 
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Voter turnout  0,02 -0,00898** -0,01 0,01 -0,0134*** 
 (-0,01) (0,00) (-0,01) (-0,01) (-0,01) 
Number of per capita crimes -0,01 0,02 0,0451** 0,000 0,000 
 (-0,03) (-0,02) (-0,02) (-0,03) (-0,01) 
Mountains dummy 0,01 -0,004** 0,015*** 0,01*** -0,012*** 
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Seaside dummy -0,026*** -0,021*** 0,000 0,038*** 0,000 
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Area -0,000*** 0,000*** 0,000 0,000*** 0,000*** 
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Constant 0,376*** 0,064*** 0,066*** 0,363*** 0,022** 
 (-0,02) (-0,01) (-0,01) (-0,02) (-0,01) 
      
Observations 59111 59111 59111 59111 59111 
N. of municipalities 7500 7500 7500 7500 7500 
Standard errors clustered at municipality level, year and provincial dummies included. The dependent variable is the share of 
expenditure devoted to a certain category over the total. 
*** p<0,01, ** p<0,05, * p<0,1 
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Table 12 
Threshold regression, including a dummy=1 if the share of woman exceeds the median value of the 
distribution, 0 otherwise; total expenditure as dependent variable. 
 
            
 Administration Education Transport Environment Social assistance 
Threshold 2 (15 % of 
women) 0,000 0,000 0,000 -0,002* 0,000 
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Gender of the major 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Council average education -0,005*** 0,001*** -0,002*** 0,001*** 0,001*** 
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Council average age -0,001*** 0,0001* -0,0003*** 0,0003** 0,0003*** 
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Civic party dummy 0,000 0,002** 0,000 0,000 -0,002** 
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Right party dummy 0,000 0,000 -0,003** 0,000 0,000 
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Left party dummy 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Ratio of children 0,08 0,410*** 0,105** -0,451*** 0,05 
 (-0,07) (-0,04) (-0,04) (-0,06) (-0,03) 
Ratio of scholars -0,120** 0,419*** 0,03 -0,271*** 0,0536* 
 (-0,06) (-0,03) (-0,04) (-0,05) (-0,03) 
Ratio of people over 65  0,211*** -0,106*** 0,157*** -0,177*** 0,00 
 (-0,03) (-0,01) (-0,02) (-0,02) (-0,01) 
GDP of the province 0,000*** 0,000*** 0,000*** -0,000*** 0,000*** 
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Population size 0,000 0,000 0,000 -0,000*** 0,000 
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Voter turnout  0,02 -0,009** -0,01 0,01 -0,0135*** 
 (-0,01) (0,00) (-0,01) (-0,01) (-0,01) 
Number of per capita crimes -0,01 0,02 0,0450** 0,000 0,000 
 (-0,03) (-0,02) (-0,02) (-0,03) (-0,01) 
Mountains dummy 0,01 -0,004** 0,015*** 0,009*** -0,012*** 
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Seaside dummy -0,026*** -0,021*** 0,00 0,038*** 0,00 
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Area -0,000*** 0,000*** 0,00 0,000*** 0,0001*** 
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Constant 0,373*** 0,064*** 0,066*** 0,365*** 0,023** 
 (-0,02) (-0,01) (-0,01) (-0,02) (-0,01) 
      
Observations 59111 59111 59111 59111 59111 
N. of municipalities 7500 7500 7500 7500 7500 
Standard errors clustered at the municipality level, year and provincial dummies included. The dependent variable is the share of 
expenditure devoted to a certain category over the total. 
*** p<0,01, ** p<0,05, * p<0,1 
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Table 13 
Threshold regression, including a dummy=1 if the share of woman exceeds the third quartile of the 
distribution, 0 otherwise; total expenditure as dependent variable. 
 
            
 Administration Education Transport Environment Social assistance 
Threshold 3 (23% of 
women) 0,003*** 0,000 0,001** -0,002** 0,000 
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Gender of the major 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Council average education -0,005*** 0,001*** -0,002*** 0,001*** 0,001*** 
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Council average age -0,001*** 0,0001* -0,0002*** 0,0003** 0,0003*** 
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Civic party dummy 0,00 0,002** 0,000 0,000 -0,002** 
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Right party dummy 0,000 0,000 -0,003** 0,000 0,000 
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Left party dummy 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Ratio of children 0,08 0,410*** 0,106** -0,451*** 0,05 
 (-0,07) (-0,04) (-0,04) (-0,06) (-0,03) 
Ratio of scholars -0,121** 0,419*** 0,03 -0,271*** 0,0536* 
 (-0,06) (-0,03) (-0,04) (-0,05) (-0,03) 
Ratio of people over 65  0,210*** -0,106*** 0,156*** -0,176*** 0,00 
 (-0,03) (-0,01) (-0,02) (-0,02) (-0,01) 
GDP of the province 0,000*** 0,000*** 0,000*** -0,000*** 0,000*** 
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Population size 0,000 0,000 0,000 -0,000*** 0,000 
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Voter turnout  0,02 -0,009** -0,01 0,01 -0,013*** 
 (-0,01) (0,00) (-0,01) (-0,01) (-0,01) 
Number of per capita crimes -0,01 0,02 0,0452** 0,000 0,000 
 (-0,03) (-0,02) (-0,02) (-0,03) (-0,01) 
Mountains dummy 0,01 -0,004** 0,015*** 0,01*** -0,012*** 
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Seaside dummy -0,025*** -0,021*** 0,000 0,038*** 0,000 
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Area -0,0003*** 0,000*** 0,00 0,000*** 0,0001*** 
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Constant 0,373*** 0,064*** 0,065*** 0,365*** 0,023** 
 (-0,02) (-0,01) (-0,01) (-0,02) (-0,01) 
      
Observations 59111 59111 59111 59111 59111 
N. of municipalities 7500 7500 7500 7500 7500 
Standard errors clustered at municipality level, year and provincial dummies included. The dependent variable is the share of 
expenditure devoted to a certain category over the total. 
*** p<0,01, ** p<0,05, * p<0,1 
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Table 14 
Cross municipality regression, using the electoral mandate as unit of observation; total expenditure 
as dependent variable. 
 
            
 Administration Education Transport Environment Social assistance 
Ratio of women in the 
council 0,060*** -0,008 0,002 -0,008 -0,029*** 
 (-0,013) (-0,007) (-0,007) (-0,010) (-0,008) 
Gender of the major -0,006 0,00369* -0,002 0,000 0,005 
 (-0,004) (-0,002) (-0,002) (-0,003) (-0,003) 
Council average education -0,014*** 0,002*** -0,005*** 0,003*** 0,007*** 
 (-0,001) (0,000) (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,001) 
Council average age -0,002*** 0,000 -0,0005*** 0,0007*** 0,001*** 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Civic party dummy 0,017*** 0,001 0,006*** -0,005 -0,008*** 
 (-0,004) (-0,002) (-0,002) (-0,003) (-0,003) 
Right party dummy 0,000 0,002 -0,003 -0,002 0,003 
 (-0,004) (-0,002) (-0,002) (-0,004) (-0,003) 
Left party dummy 0,005 0,003 0,010*** -0,007* -0,002 
 (-0,005) (-0,003) (-0,003) (-0,004) (-0,004) 
Ratio of children -0,063 0,348*** 0,079 -0,069 -0,034 
 (-0,194) (-0,096) (-0,123) (-0,138) (-0,098) 
Ratio of scholars -0,245* 0,649*** 0,063 -0,285*** 0,064 
 (-0,141) (-0,076) (-0,090) (-0,110) (-0,077) 
Ratio of people over 65  0,208*** -0,072*** 0,197*** -0,164*** -0,077*** 
 (-0,045) (-0,022) (-0,028) (-0,035) (-0,025) 
GDP of the province 0,000 0,000 0,000 -0,000*** 0,000 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Population size 1,21e-07* 0,000 4,00e-08* -0,000*** 0,000 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Voter turnout  0,102*** -0,021** 0,005 0,008 -0,085*** 
 (-0,019) (-0,009) (-0,013) (-0,016) (-0,012) 
Number of per capita crimes 0,029 0,210 0,314 -0,302 0,086 
 (-0,461) (-0,212) (-0,244) (-0,289) (-0,242) 
Mountains dummy 0,001 -0,004 0,013*** 0,013*** -0,009*** 
 (-0,005) (-0,003) (-0,003) (-0,005) (-0,003) 
Seaside dummy -0,014*** -0,020*** 0,001 0,032*** -0,008*** 
 (-0,004) (-0,002) (-0,002) (-0,004) (-0,002) 
Area -0,0003*** 0,000* 0,000** 0,000 0,000** 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Constant 0,412*** 0,035 0,027 0,398*** 0,040 
 (-0,092) (-0,042) (-0,047) (-0,074) (-0,058) 
      
Observations 5462 5462 5462 5462 5462 
R squared 0,322 0,359 0,269 0,294 0,291 
Standard errors are robust,  year and provincial dummies included. The dependent variable is the share of expenditure devoted 
to a certain category over the total. 
*** p<0,01, ** p<0,05, * p<0,1 
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Table 15 
    Coefficients’ signs and significance for the women ratio, total expenditure. 
 
 
Administration Education Transport Environment Social assistance
Female ratio in the council ++     
Female ratio belonging to the 
major affiliation  
++  +   
Female ratio in the executive 
committee 
    _ 
Threshold 1 (8% of women)      
Threshold 2 (15% of women)    _  
Threshold 3 (23% of women) +++  ++ _ _  
Female ratio in the council, 
electoral mandate 
+++    _ _ _ 
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Table 16 
IV regressions, first stage of the estimation. 
 
 
       women ratio 
  
gender quotas 0,014*** 
 (-0,004) 
sex of the major 0,039*** 
 (-0,003) 
council average edu 0,007*** 
 (-0,001) 
council average age -0,004*** 
 (-0,0002) 
civic party 0,00 
 (-0,003) 
right party -0,010*** 
 (-0,004) 
left party 0,00 
 (-0,003) 
% of children 0,05 
 (-0,077) 
% of scholars 0,04 
 (-0,065) 
% of old people 0,142*** 
 (-0,0279) 
GDP province 0,000*** 
 (-0,000) 
Pop 0,00 
 (-0,000) 
Human capital -0,01 
 (-0,0162) 
Per capita crimes -0,01 
 (-0,036) 
Mountains 0,00 
 (-0,004) 
Seaside -0,010*** 
 (-0,004) 
Area -0,0002*** 
 (-0,000) 
Constant 0,243*** 
 -0,03 
  
Observations 46300 
F test  on the relevance of 
the instrument 
11,5*** 
 
N. of municipalities 7474 
Standard errors in parentheses, year and provincial 
dummies. 
*** p<0,01, ** p<0,05, * p<0,1 
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Table 17 
IV regressions, total expenditure as dependent variable. 
 
            
 Administration Education Transport Environment Social assistance 
      
Ratio of women in the council 0,094 0,171 0,314 0,158 -0,231 
 (-0,312) (-0,164) (-0,202) (-0,253) (-0,228) 
Gender of the major -0,003 -0,007 -0,0142* -0,007 0,008 
 (-0,013) (-0,007) (-0,008) (-0,011) (-0,008) 
Council average education -0,007*** 0,000 -0,004*** 0,000 0,003* 
 (-0,002) (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,002) (-0,002) 
Council average age -0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 -0,001 
 (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,001) 
Civic party dummy 0,004** 0,004*** 0,000 -0,002 -0,003** 
 (-0,002) (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,002) (-0,001) 
Right party dummy 0,000 0,002 -0,002 0,001 -0,001 
 (-0,004) (-0,002) (-0,003) (-0,003) (-0,002) 
Left party dummy -0,001 0,001 -0,002 0,000 -0,001 
 (-0,002) (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,002) (-0,001) 
Ratio of children 0,078 0,462*** 0,122*** -0,479*** 0,027 
 (-0,062) (-0,031) (-0,042) (-0,056) (-0,036) 
Ratio of scholars -0,128** 0,407*** -0,007 -0,174*** 0,032 
 (-0,051) (-0,026) (-0,035) (-0,046) (-0,031) 
Ratio of people over 65  0,226*** -0,134*** 0,123*** -0,196*** -0,007 
 (-0,051) (-0,026) (-0,033) (-0,042) (-0,030) 
GDP of the province 0,000*** 0,000*** 0,000*** 0,000*** 0,000*** 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Population size 0,000*** 0,000 0,000* 0,000*** 0,000 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Voter turnout  0,018* -0,012** -0,006 0,013 -0,019*** 
 (-0,010) (-0,005) (-0,006) (-0,008) (-0,005) 
Number of per capita crimes -0,037 0,013 0,015 0,141*** -0,0313* 
 (-0,035) (-0,017) (-0,024) (-0,033) (-0,016) 
Mountains dummy 0,004 -0,004* 0,014*** 0,008** -0,011*** 
 (-0,005) (-0,003) (-0,003) (-0,004) (-0,004) 
Seaside dummy -0,028*** -0,020*** 0,004 0,040*** -0,005 
 (-0,005) (-0,003) (-0,003) (-0,004) (-0,004) 
Area -0,000*** -0,000* -0,000* 0,000 0,000 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Constant 0,370*** 0,016 -0,009 0,294*** 0,094* 
 (-0,083) (-0,043) (-0,055) (-0,071) (-0,056) 
      
Observations 46300 46300 46300 46300 46300 
N. of municipalities 7474 7474 7474 7474 7474 
Standard errors clustered at municipality level, year and provincial dummies included. The dependent variable is the share of 
expenditure devoted to a certain category over the total. 
*** p<0,01, ** p<0,05, * p<0,1 
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Table 18 
IV regressions, capital expenditure as dependent variable. 
 
            
 Administration Education Transport Environment Social assistance 
      
Ratio of women in the 
council -0,508 0,341 1,086 0,686 -0,135 
 (-0,760) (-0,387) (-0,677) (-0,776) (-0,208) 
Gender of the major 0,028 -0,013 -0,060* -0,028 0,009 
 (-0,039) (-0,022) (-0,036) (-0,040) (-0,012) 
Council average education 0,005 0,003** -0,009*** -0,006 0,001* 
 (-0,003) (-0,001) (-0,003) (-0,003) (-0,001) 
Council average age -0,002 0,002 0,004 0,003 0,000 
 (-0,004) (-0,002) (-0,003) (-0,004) (-0,001) 
Civic party dummy 0,0112* -0,00649* 0,000 0,000 -0,002 
 (-0,006) (-0,004) (-0,006) (-0,006) (-0,002) 
Right party dummy 0,0249* -0,008 0,007 -0,005 -0,003 
 (-0,013) (-0,007) (-0,012) (-0,013) (-0,004) 
Left party dummy 0,0121* -0,006 -0,006 0,009 -0,003 
 (-0,007) (-0,004) (-0,006) (-0,007) (-0,002) 
Ratio of children 0,017 0,497*** 0,369* -0,226 -0,117* 
 (-0,219) (-0,130) (-0,204) (-0,224) (-0,067) 
Ratio of scholars -0,384** 0,475*** 0,021 0,063 -0,038 
 (-0,178) (-0,103) (-0,165) (-0,182) (-0,054) 
Ratio of people over 65  -0,018 -0,185*** 0,063 -0,121 -0,003 
 (-0,122) (-0,058) (-0,107) (-0,125) (-0,032) 
GDP of the province 0,000 0,000 0,000 -0,000*** 0,000 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Population size 0,000*** -0,000*** 0,000*** -0,000*** 0,000 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Voter turnout  -0,016 -0,023 0,006 -0,025 -0,002 
 (-0,029) (-0,016) (-0,026) (-0,030) (-0,008) 
Number of per capita crimes -0,043 0,122 -0,012 0,130 -0,0807* 
 (-0,148) (-0,097) (-0,142) (-0,151) (-0,049) 
Mountains dummy -0,041*** -0,005 0,010 0,039*** 0,000 
 (-0,011) (-0,006) (-0,010) (-0,011) (-0,003) 
Seaside dummy 0,013 -0,022*** 0,011 0,019 -0,007** 
 (-0,012) (-0,006) (-0,010) (-0,012) (-0,003) 
Area 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Constant 0,404* -0,108 -0,170 0,197 0,079 
 (-0,243) (-0,134) (-0,222) (-0,249) (-0,071) 
      
Observations 46300 46300 46300 46300 46300 
N. of municipalities 7474 7474 7474 7474 7474 
Standard errors clustered at municipality level, year and provincial dummies included. The dependent variable is the share of 
expenditure devoted to a certain category over the total. 
*** p<0,01, ** p<0,05, * p<0,1 
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Table 19 
IV regressions, current expenditure as dependent variable. 
 
            
 Administration Education Transport Environment Social assistance 
      
Ratio of women in the council 0,118 0,155 0,192 0,223 -0,238 
 (-0,305) (-0,166) (-0,180) (-0,242) (-0,243) 
Gender of the major -0,003 -0,005 -0,008 -0,011 0,008 
 (-0,011) (-0,006) (-0,007) (-0,009) (-0,009) 
Council average education -0,005** 0,000 -0,002 -0,001 0,003 
 (-0,002) (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,002) (-0,002) 
Council average age 0,000 0,001 0,001 0,001 -0,001 
 (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,001) 
Civic party dummy 0,002 0,004*** 0,000 -0,001 -0,003*** 
 (-0,002) (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,001) 
Right party dummy -0,002 0,003 0,001 0,002 -0,002 
 (-0,003) (-0,002) (-0,002) (-0,003) (-0,002) 
Left party dummy 0,000 0,002*** 0,000 -0,002* -0,002** 
 (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,001) (-0,001) 
Ratio of children -0,023 0,450*** 0,066** -0,436*** 0,071* 
 (-0,050) (-0,028) (-0,028) (-0,042) (-0,037) 
Ratio of scholars -0,148*** 0,401*** 0,005 -0,213*** 0,049 
 (-0,042) (-0,023) (-0,024) (-0,035) (-0,032) 
Ratio of people over 65  0,229*** -0,135*** 0,101*** -0,190*** 0,019 
 (-0,042) (-0,023) (-0,023) (-0,036) (-0,029) 
GDP of the province 0,000 0,000*** 0,000 -0,000*** 0,000*** 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Population size 0,000 0,000 0,000** -0,000** 0,000* 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Voter turnout  0,001 -0,012*** -0,006 0,031*** -0,016*** 
 (-0,008) (-0,004) (-0,004) (-0,007) (-0,005) 
Number of per capita crimes 0,018 -0,010 0,006 0,108*** -0,048*** 
 (-0,023) (-0,013) (-0,012) (-0,021) (-0,015) 
Mountains dummy 0,013*** -0,004* 0,014*** 0,004 -0,012*** 
 (-0,005) (-0,003) (-0,003) (-0,004) (-0,004) 
Seaside dummy -0,035*** -0,020*** 0,002 0,05*** -0,005 
 (-0,006) (-0,003) (-0,003) (-0,004) (-0,005) 
Area -0,000*** 0,000* 0,000 0,000* 0,000 
 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Constant 0,379*** 0,029 0,021 0,258*** 0,083 
 (-0,075) (-0,041) (-0,044) (-0,061) (-0,058) 
      
Observations 46300 46300 46300 46300 46300 
N. of municipalities 7474 7474 7474 7474 7474 
Standard errors clustered at municipality level, year and provincial dummies included. The dependent variable is the share of 
expenditure devoted to a certain category over the total. 
*** p<0,01, ** p<0,05, * p<0,1 
 
 
 
